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Corporate Liquidity 
One of the unusual aspects of  this recession 
has been an increase in short-term corporate 
debt and a corresponding decrease in corpo-
rate liquidity. Because this has occurred at a 
time of high short-term interest rates,  it has 
put extraord  i  nary pressu res on corporations 
and added to the business cycle risks they 
already face. 
Typically, in a business cycle recession, long-
term interest rates fall and corporations re-
spond by shifting borrowings out of  the 
short-term market into the long-term market 
to lock in longer maturity debt and to increase 
corporate liquidity. This has not happened in 
the 1980-1982 period of  double-dip reces-
sion because long-term interest rates, instead 
of  falling, have actually risen, from an aver-
age of 9 percent in 1979 to an average of 14 
percent in 1982. At the same time, the ability 
of  the long-term bond market to absorb cor-
porate borrowing has shrunk. Less than a 
third of  the volume of new issues has ap-
peared in the first halfof 1982 as compared 
to the average of 1980. These two elements 
combined have increased the dependence of 
corporations on short-term financing and un-
dermined their liquidity positions. 
As shown in Chart 1, the distribution of busi-
ness cycle risk, while higher in the last two 
years, is uneven. Aaa-rated corporations 
have had an increase in risks relative to the 
late 1970's but the increased risks are actually 
lower than in the early to mid-70's. On the 
other hand, Baa-rated corporations have had 
an extraordinary rise in the amount of per-
ceived business cycle risks in the last two 
years. The best managed and best positioned 
corporations have not suffered an extraordi-
nary increase in risk as perceived by the fi-
nancial markets but the less well-positioned 
corporations have. 
The problem of  corporate illiquidity is ulti-
mately due to the government deficit. It is the 
major factor behind rises in long-term rates 
and thus the extraordinary dependence of 
corporations on short-term financing. The 
deficit raises long-term rates and reduces the 
volume of long-term corporate financing by 
its secular nature, which produces uncertain-
ty about future credit demands, by the way it 
is perceived to affect future monetary policy 
and by the way the U.S. Treasury manages 
its borrowi  ng. 
Secular deficits 
In the past, the government deficit was a tem- . 
porary business cycle phenomenon, but the 
current deficit is secular, i.e., structural and 
permanent. This is illustrated in Chart 2. In 
past business cycle recessions, the progres-
sive income tax structure ensured that the 
decline in tax receipts was proportionately 
greater than the decline in GNP, so deficits 
grew. However, because recession-induced 
declines in business credit demand exceeded 
increases in government demand for credit, 
interest rates fell. During business cycle ex-
pansions, tax receipts rose proportionately 
faster than increases in income, causing def-
icits to shrink. At the same time, private de-
mand for credit grew faster than government 
demands for credit fell causing interest rates 
to rise. As both were induced by the business-
cycle, deficits and interest rates moved in 
opposite directions. 
Now that the deficit is secu lar, deficits and 
interest rates can be expected to move to-
gether. Two forecasts for deficits are shown 
through fiscal 1985 in Chart 2. An "optimis-
tic" Administration forecast is that the deficit 
wi  II be 3  V2  to 4 percent of GNP for the next 
five years. The "pessimistic" Congressional 
budget office forecast, which closely parallels 
private forecasts, is that the deficit will be in 
the 5 %- to 6-percent range for the next five 
years. Although both forecasts assume vigor-
ous growth in economic activity, the deficits 
are not expected to decline largely because 
the major tax cuts enacted last year had an 
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nature of the tax structure. Tax receipts will 
rise only about in line with the growth in 
national income. With government spending 
expected to grow at about this same rate, the 
deficits are not  expected to decline in the next 
business cycle upswing. 
Long-term uncertainty The existence of secu-
lar deficits has created great uncertainty in 
financial markets about future demands for 
credit. If private demands for credit rise with 
the business cycle expansion and govern-
ment demand for credit does not fall, then 
total credit demand will exceed the national 
savings rate and crowd out some private 
spending. How much crowding out will oc-
cur depends upon the size of  the deficit, 
which, as indicated in Chart 2, is highly un-
certain. Forward looking financial market 
participants facing this degree of uncertainty 
about the future have shifted to the short-end 
of the market where uncertainty is much less 
of a problem. This is a key reason for the 
drying up of savings otherwise available in 
the long-end of  the market. 
Inflation risk Secular government deficits 
over the next five years also create great con-
cern that the Federal Reserve will eventually 
be forced to monetize the deficits through 
increased growth in the money supply. 
As shown in the Weekly Letter of May 21, 
1982, the annual rate of  growth in the money 
supply and the national debt has been fairly 
closely related since World War II. Since the 
change in the Fed's operating procedures in 
October 1979, that relationship has broken 
down as the growth in the national debt has 
accelerated wh  i  Ie the growth of the money 
supply has decelerated. However, there is 
serious concern that the Fed will monetize 
some share ofthe 10 to 15 percent growth in 
the national debt that is expected to occur in 
each of the next five years. Full monetization 
could suggest as much as  15 percent annual 
growth in the money supply. The Federal Re-
serve, resisting monetization, could suggest 
annual growth of the money supply of 5 per-
cent or less for the next five years. These 
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policies represent sharply divergent views 
about the future rates of inflation and conse-
quently current inflation premiums in long-
term bond rates. In addition, the risk and 
uncertainty about the course of monetary 
policy over the next five years created by 
secular deficits adds an inflation risk pre-
mium to long rates even when the current 
inflation rate is declining. Markets remember 
thatthe sharp decline in inflation in 1975-76 
was temporary as easy money in subsequent 
years led to another round of double digit 
inflation: 
Debt management 
The debt management policy of the u.s. 
Treasury has also impaired private corporate 
access to long-term funds. From 1976-1981 
the u.S. Treasury has increased the average 
maturity of  the national debt by more than 50 
percent, from 2.6 to 4 years. If this trend is not 
reversed, an increasing share of larger future 
deficits will be financed at the long-term end 
of the market. 
Despite the announced Administration pol-
icy to reduce inflation, the Treasury continues 
to lengthen the maturity of  the national debt. 
Financing the deficit in the long-term market 
means the Treasury will be repaying debts 
with future dollars which have greater value 
than had previously been expected. With 
current high long-term interest rates based at 
least partially on market concerns that the 
in'flation rate will not decline as planned, this 
policy increases the real burden of financing 
the national debt. The least-cost way would 
be to shift financing to the short-end of the 
market. While short rates are as high as long 
rates now, the possibility of rolling over the 
debt in the future, when the Administration's 
lower inflation forecast is realized and re-
flected in lower interest rates, would reduce 
the future financing burden. 
Policy solutions 
Fiscal policy can reduce the expected size of 
the deficit over the coming years by a combi-
nation of  tax increases and spending de-
creases.This is essentially a political problem with which Congress and the Administration 
are now grappling. The Federal Reserve can 
ease the liquidity strains on corporations only 
by increasing the supply of real money, i.e. 
the nominal money supply adjusted for infla-
tion. If money and inflation are growing at 
the same rate, the real money supply is un-
changed and corporate liquidity is not in-
creased in any real sense. The supply of real 
money can be increased in one of two ways: 
fi rst, by an increase in the rate of  growth of  the 
nominal money supply in excess of the infla-
tion rate; and second, by reducing the infla-
tion rate below the. growth in the nominal 
money supply. 
In the current environment, there is pressure 
on the Fed to choose the fi rst of  these alterna-
tives: raise the nominal money supply. There 
are, however, two problems with this solu-
tion. First, it is only a short-run fix in helping 
increase liquidity and lower short-term inter-
est rates. It requires the nominal money sup-
ply to rise faster than the inflation rate, but 
because money affects inflation, that further 
requires an accelerating growth in money 
overtime. This is ultimately self-defeating be-
cause inflation increases the cost of holding 
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real money balances. Furthermore, double-
digit inflation would re-emerge and cause the 
Fed eventually to reduce nominal money 
growth. Corporations and the financial sys-
tem will then be forced into a tight money 
squeeze once again. Second, the method will 
do nothing to solve the fundamental financial 
problem of  corporations~the inability to tap 
long-term funds. Raising the nominal money 
supply will raise the inflation rate in the 
futu re, and inflation expectations today and 
wi  II either prevent long-term rates from faIl-
ing or cause them to rise further. This, of 
course, means thatthe ability ofthe long-term 
markets to absorb corporate financing will 
remain impaired. Corporations will continue 
to be forced to turn to banks and other short-
term sources of funds. They will continue to 
be subject to variations in short-term interest 
rates and they will continue to face the struc-
tural risk associated with illiquidity. 
The second method of increasing real money 
by reducing inflation, while slow, can have a 
far more permanent effect. Because lower 
inflation reduces the cost of holding money, 
it will induce people to hold larger real 
money balances. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELffH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 






































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  +  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
7/14/82  7/7/82 
55  97 
10  50 
45  47 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
9,459  6.3 
10,203  7.9 
5,219  13.5 
3,683  6.9 
567  2.5 
656  41.3 
415  6.7 
1,159  7.8 
3,445  - 8.0 
1,769  - 5.9 
234  0.1 
14,391  17.3 
13,429  18.0 
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